TNAG-0113-FCO40-149-Detainees-and-prisoners-following-19671968-disturbances-1969 — Page 57

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TO ENSURE THAT NO ACTION WAS TAKEN BY THE HONG KONG AUTHORITIES

WHICH THE CHINESE MIGHT REGARD AS PROVOCATIVE OR USE AS A PRETEXT

FOR UPSETTING THE DEAL.

THE GOVERNOR SAID THAT HE WOULD CERTAINLY CONTINUE TO SEARCH

FOR A DEFENSIBLE MEANS OF EARLIER RELEASE BUT IN THE ABOVE

CIRCUMSTANCES HE WOULD BE LESS THAN HONEST IF HE DID NOT SAY

THAT THE PROSPECTS WERE NOT GOOD. HE COULD NOT AGREE TO A FLAT

POLITICAL DEAL WITHOUT AN ADEQUATE COVER STORY SINCE THIS WOULD

REPRESENT A FUNDAMENTAL REVERSAL OF OUR POLICY TOWARDS CHINA OVER

HONG KONG, NAMELY THAT OF NOT GIVING WAY UNDER PRESSURE SEMICOLON

THIS WOULD HAVE INCALCULABLE CONSEQUENCES. BUT HE WOULD EXAMINE ALL

MEANS SHORT OF THIS.

5. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE GOVERNOR WOULD REEXAMINE EVERY ASPECT AND

SEND A FULL APPRAISAL BY MY RETURN ON 19 JUNE.

6. I DOUBT. IF THE GOVERNOR'S FINAL ASSESSMENT WILL DIFFER GREATLY

FROM ABOVE. HOWEVER I WILL DEFER MY RECOMMENDATION UNTIL I HAVE

SEEN IT.

7. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BROOKE CASE FOR GREY ARE HARDER TO

ASSESS FROM HERE, BUT IT WOULD CLEARLY BE VERY DESIRABLE TO DEFER

PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF ANY DEAL OVER BROOKE UNTIL AFTER OCTOBER SINCE

(A) IT WOULD STIMULATE EXTREME PUBLIC PRESSURE FOR ACTION OVER

GREY AND

(B) IT MIGHT CAUSE AN ADVERSE REACTION IN PEKING SINCE WE HAVE

REPEATEDLY TOLD THE CHINESE THAT WE COULD NOT AS A DIRECT BARGAIN

RELEASE CONVICTED PRISONERS IN HONG KONG IN EXCHANGE FOR GREY.

BOTH OF THESE WOULD, IN MY VIEW, AFFECT ADVERSELY GREY'S CHANCES OF

EARLY RELEASE.

SIR D. TRENCH ·

PRISEC

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