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TO ENSURE THAT NO ACTION WAS TAKEN BY THE HONG KONG AUTHORITIES
WHICH THE CHINESE MIGHT REGARD AS PROVOCATIVE OR USE AS A PRETEXT
FOR UPSETTING THE DEAL.
THE GOVERNOR SAID THAT HE WOULD CERTAINLY CONTINUE TO SEARCH
FOR A DEFENSIBLE MEANS OF EARLIER RELEASE BUT IN THE ABOVE
CIRCUMSTANCES HE WOULD BE LESS THAN HONEST IF HE DID NOT SAY
THAT THE PROSPECTS WERE NOT GOOD. HE COULD NOT AGREE TO A FLAT
POLITICAL DEAL WITHOUT AN ADEQUATE COVER STORY SINCE THIS WOULD
REPRESENT A FUNDAMENTAL REVERSAL OF OUR POLICY TOWARDS CHINA OVER
HONG KONG, NAMELY THAT OF NOT GIVING WAY UNDER PRESSURE SEMICOLON
THIS WOULD HAVE INCALCULABLE CONSEQUENCES. BUT HE WOULD EXAMINE ALL
MEANS SHORT OF THIS.
5. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE GOVERNOR WOULD REEXAMINE EVERY ASPECT AND
SEND A FULL APPRAISAL BY MY RETURN ON 19 JUNE.
6. I DOUBT. IF THE GOVERNOR'S FINAL ASSESSMENT WILL DIFFER GREATLY
FROM ABOVE. HOWEVER I WILL DEFER MY RECOMMENDATION UNTIL I HAVE
SEEN IT.
7. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BROOKE CASE FOR GREY ARE HARDER TO
ASSESS FROM HERE, BUT IT WOULD CLEARLY BE VERY DESIRABLE TO DEFER
PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF ANY DEAL OVER BROOKE UNTIL AFTER OCTOBER SINCE
(A) IT WOULD STIMULATE EXTREME PUBLIC PRESSURE FOR ACTION OVER
GREY AND
(B) IT MIGHT CAUSE AN ADVERSE REACTION IN PEKING SINCE WE HAVE
REPEATEDLY TOLD THE CHINESE THAT WE COULD NOT AS A DIRECT BARGAIN
RELEASE CONVICTED PRISONERS IN HONG KONG IN EXCHANGE FOR GREY.
BOTH OF THESE WOULD, IN MY VIEW, AFFECT ADVERSELY GREY'S CHANCES OF
EARLY RELEASE.
SIR D. TRENCH ·
PRISEC
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