TNAG-0113-FCO40-149-Detainees-and-prisoners-following-19671968-disturbances-1969 — Page 176

11.

SECRET

(c)

criticism.

For tactical reasons we have not

wished to stimulate indignation against the

Chinese lest this would lead to increased

pressure for unhelpful measures against them in

this country. We have therefore refrained from

using to the full the strong arguments for refusing

to pay ransom in Hong Kong. We have, however, a

good case and could deploy it if necessary. More-

over, if need arose, we could make public the

continuing refusal of the Chinese to entertain

the idea of a reasonable solution through deport-

ation of the news workers to China.

Will continuing refusal to meet the Chinese terms

be likely to result in a hardening in their policies

towards Hong Kong? We do not know what precisely

is happening among the top leadership in Peking.

There are some indications of serious policy

differences.

However, since the beginning of

1968, even at moments of extreme internal agitation,

there has been no indication that the leaders were

prepared again to jeopardise their chances of

recovering their following in Hong Kong or, more

important, their large foreign exchange earnings

from the Colony by further radical initiatives.

We do not suppose that they would take such a risk

now.

Despite the difficulties therefore, my conclusion is

/that we

-7.