11.
SECRET
(c)
criticism.
For tactical reasons we have not
wished to stimulate indignation against the
Chinese lest this would lead to increased
pressure for unhelpful measures against them in
this country. We have therefore refrained from
using to the full the strong arguments for refusing
to pay ransom in Hong Kong. We have, however, a
good case and could deploy it if necessary. More-
over, if need arose, we could make public the
continuing refusal of the Chinese to entertain
the idea of a reasonable solution through deport-
ation of the news workers to China.
Will continuing refusal to meet the Chinese terms
be likely to result in a hardening in their policies
towards Hong Kong? We do not know what precisely
is happening among the top leadership in Peking.
There are some indications of serious policy
differences.
However, since the beginning of
1968, even at moments of extreme internal agitation,
there has been no indication that the leaders were
prepared again to jeopardise their chances of
recovering their following in Hong Kong or, more
important, their large foreign exchange earnings
from the Colony by further radical initiatives.
We do not suppose that they would take such a risk
now.
Despite the difficulties therefore, my conclusion is
/that we
-7.