TNAG-0109-FCO40-145-Detainees-and-prisoners-following-19671968-disturbances-1968 — Page 112

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"pinpricks", and serious economic pressure (Peking telegram No.586)

which would come later and would inevitably provoke retaliation.

I

am not convinced that such "pinpricks" would have the desired effect

or more important from a practical point of view that we should

ever secure the agreement of other interested Departments, the Bank

of England and British firms in such a course of action. It would

certainly require a decision at the highest level that as a means

of political pressure to secure better treatment for British sub-

jects in China, everything possible should be done to discourage

commercial contact with China regardless of the consequences.

7. Thus, even had there been no progress in the matter of exit

visas, I doubt if a convincing case could have been made out for

economic pressure. In the new circumstances, there is certainly

nothing to be gained by attempting such a policy.

8.

However, I see some advantage in discreet publicity directed

at the commercial reputation of the Chinese. The unilateral annul-

ment of the Vicker-Zimmer contract and various other recent actions

suggest that the Chinese may be engaging in something near sharp

practice to minimise liabilities which are becoming onerous and

contributing to the shortage of foreign exchange. This might with

due discretion be exploited to demonstrate that China's former

excellent commercial reputation is becoming tarnished (Peking tele-

gram No. 672). We might also try to persuade representatives of the

Sino-British Trade Council and other British businessmen to be a

little less sycophantic in their dealings with the Chinese in

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