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"pinpricks", and serious economic pressure (Peking telegram No.586)
which would come later and would inevitably provoke retaliation.
I
am not convinced that such "pinpricks" would have the desired effect
or more important from a practical point of view that we should
ever secure the agreement of other interested Departments, the Bank
of England and British firms in such a course of action. It would
certainly require a decision at the highest level that as a means
of political pressure to secure better treatment for British sub-
jects in China, everything possible should be done to discourage
commercial contact with China regardless of the consequences.
7. Thus, even had there been no progress in the matter of exit
visas, I doubt if a convincing case could have been made out for
economic pressure. In the new circumstances, there is certainly
nothing to be gained by attempting such a policy.
8.
However, I see some advantage in discreet publicity directed
at the commercial reputation of the Chinese. The unilateral annul-
ment of the Vicker-Zimmer contract and various other recent actions
suggest that the Chinese may be engaging in something near sharp
practice to minimise liabilities which are becoming onerous and
contributing to the shortage of foreign exchange. This might with
due discretion be exploited to demonstrate that China's former
excellent commercial reputation is becoming tarnished (Peking tele-
gram No. 672). We might also try to persuade representatives of the
Sino-British Trade Council and other British businessmen to be a
little less sycophantic in their dealings with the Chinese in
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