TNAG-0103-FCO40-139-Briefs-and-background-notes-for-Lord-Shepherd-1967 — Page 100

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BACKGROUND NOTES

DEFENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY

NO. 7

Hong Kong could not be defended against a determined Chinese attack

except perhaps by the use of nuclear weapons. There are no plans for the

reinforcement of Hong Kong against external aggression and the external

role of the garrison is to "identify aggression". Although there is no

agreement with the United States about coming to the defence of Hong Kong,

the U.S. Government have been given an assurance that it is our intention

to resist aggression. Local opinion, while probably under no illusion

about the ability of the prosent garrison to resist for long, regards the

existence of British troops deployed to guard the frontier as an assurance

of our intention to defend the Colony; it is probably assumed locally

that in any general hostilities in the area the Seventh Fleet would, if

necessary, intervene.

2.

An overt attack by the Chinese is less likely than an attempt to get

the Colony by subversion. Our ability to preserve law and order depends

essentially on maintaining the confidence of the Chinese population in the

British intention to stay. The majority are politically inarticulate.

Their wish is to trade and survive. They do not wish to be on the losing

side and once their confidence started to slip the process would be

accumulative and there would be an increasing tendency to transfer

allegiance to Peking.

3. At the end of 1966 British military forces in the Colony were 63

najor iray units, four fighter aircraft and three coastal minesweepers.

The Army units were to have been reduced to 5 major units during

1967-68; but this decision was never publicly announced and has been

indefinitely postponed because of the present disturbed conditions.

/garrison

The

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