SECRET
BACKGROUND NOTES
DEFENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY
NO. 7
Hong Kong could not be defended against a determined Chinese attack
except perhaps by the use of nuclear weapons. There are no plans for the
reinforcement of Hong Kong against external aggression and the external
role of the garrison is to "identify aggression". Although there is no
agreement with the United States about coming to the defence of Hong Kong,
the U.S. Government have been given an assurance that it is our intention
to resist aggression. Local opinion, while probably under no illusion
about the ability of the prosent garrison to resist for long, regards the
existence of British troops deployed to guard the frontier as an assurance
of our intention to defend the Colony; it is probably assumed locally
that in any general hostilities in the area the Seventh Fleet would, if
necessary, intervene.
2.
An overt attack by the Chinese is less likely than an attempt to get
the Colony by subversion. Our ability to preserve law and order depends
essentially on maintaining the confidence of the Chinese population in the
British intention to stay. The majority are politically inarticulate.
Their wish is to trade and survive. They do not wish to be on the losing
side and once their confidence started to slip the process would be
accumulative and there would be an increasing tendency to transfer
allegiance to Peking.
3. At the end of 1966 British military forces in the Colony were 63
najor iray units, four fighter aircraft and three coastal minesweepers.
The Army units were to have been reduced to 5 major units during
1967-68; but this decision was never publicly announced and has been
indefinitely postponed because of the present disturbed conditions.
/garrison
The
SECRET