TNAG-0061-FCO40-97-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1968 — Page 94

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seems to me to be as much a military as a political point.

6. A small fighter presence would have considerable value in

terms of sustaining public morale; in its absence, the effect of

a Chinese intrusion into Hong Kong air space would be catastrophic.

There has been a tendency here to write off the possibility of

intrusion because there has been none in the years since the

communists came to power. I do not think we should regard the

risk too lightly. The Governor mentioned to me that in 1955

Formosan military aircraft intruded into Hong Kong air space; any

repitition of this, in circumstances which showed that we were

unable to react, would enable China to claim that we were responsi-

ble for a gap in their own air defences and provide a good excuse

for Chinese aircraft to patrol Hong Kong's air space.

7. There is another point. The despatch of fighters from the

United Kingdom to deal with any incident involving China must

appear as a political act and could exacerbate the situation in a

way that the reactions of forces based locally would not do.

8. The Governor during his recent visit made certain tentative

proposals for a small fighter unit backed by a Hong Kong Auxiliary

Air Force component and taking into account the facilities for

maintenance provided locally by the Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering

Corporation. This is being studied, I understand, in the Air

Force department. The Governor's plan envisages that the Hong Kong

Government will take responsibility for part of the operating

costs; it assumes, however, that the Hong Kong Government would

not be required to purchase the aircraft. This, I think, is a

very helpful proposition and, provided that there are no technical

or military objections, possibly indicates an acceptable solution.

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