TNAG-0061-FCO40-97-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1968 — Page 93

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Force Levels

3. I accept the M.O.D. view that the force levels proposed are

the minimum required to maintain our position in the Colony. The

increases are necessary because of our withdrawal from Singapore/

Malaysia. For example, we shall now need to have five minesweepers

in Hong Kong to do what two or three deployed from Singapore/

have done hitherto.

4.

The consequences of withdrawal from Singapore/Malaysia are

firstly that we shall have to base naval and air forces in the

Colony whereas we are at present able to provide the necessary

cover and backing by deployment from Singapore. Secondly, reinfor-

cements will have to come from the United Kingdom, will take longer

and the periods involved will not meet the safety requirements in a

Colony where situations requiring our intervention can arise so

suddenly. Thirdly there is the question of maintaining the

morale of the local population upon which our whole position

depends: this is bound to droop as the process of withdrawal

brings home to Hong Kong its isolation. Finally we must not

overlook the effect on China's attitude towards the Colony of any

indication that we are not concerned to maintain our position there.

Permanent Fighter Presence

5. I share the Governor's view that there should be a permanent

fighter presence in Hong Kong. The political arguments are, I

consider, strong and I have set them out in a letter to the Defence

Secretary. While it is not for me to dispute the assessment of

the Ministry of Defence on the military value of a small detachment

of fighters in Hong Kong, I am impressed by the arguments which

draw attention to their value as a deterrent to the Chinese.

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