TNAG-0060-FCO40-96-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1968 — Page 36

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ANNEX A TO COS 1252/5/4/68

(Continued

CINCFE does not propose to withdraw.

There would also be

over 30,000 British and Commonwealth civilians with a claim to protection in emergency. A further consideration is that short unaccompanied rather than longer accompanied tours would increase the rate of turnover and turbulence within the garrison, which could lower its efficiency.

Provision of Units

9. Experience has shown that a backing of three units is needed to maintain each unaccompanied unit, and that to minimize turbulence this backing should be stationed in the United Kingdom. Whilst the Gurkhas maintain their present contribution to the garrison, the Army could without undue difficulty provide the necessary unaccompanied units, although the accelerated rundown of units resulting from the post- devaluation defence review would mean that the Strategic Reserve would become the only source of backing units.

10. However, there will be insufficient units in the United Kingdom alone to meet the whole requirement once the Hong Kong garrison is composed solely of British units. A study has shown that, short of an increase in overall force levels which we believe to be unacceptable, this problem could be overcome only by abandoning the principle of providing un- accompanied units from those based in the United Kingdom. Any unit would have to be prepared to undertake an unaccompanied tour as a routine move on change of station. This would make all units in Europe available for these tours, but would deprive them of a fixed base during their absence.. If the unit was outside the United Kingdom, in BAOR for instance, its families would have to move to the Unit ed Kingdom to make way for the families of the replacement unit.

น

11.

It is important to remember that this would affect a substantial proportion of the Army. The equivalent of some nine major units would have unaccompanied tours every year, and this would continue indefinitely. This would be a scale of planned unaccompanied service never previously contemplated, even with a larger Army. Any unaccompanied tours to meet unforeseeable contingencies would, of course, be in addition to this. The greatly increased turbulence for families and the effects on efficiency and morale would have to be accepted if this course became operationally essential, but we should not resort to such measures unless they should become inevitable.

Morale

12. Single Men.

Unaccompanied service would provide

increased opportunity for overseas service which would be welcomed by most young and single men.

A - 3

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