TNAG-0060-FCO40-96-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1968 — Page 35

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ANNEX A TO COS 1252/5/4/68 Continued

Future Course of Events

5. A recent JIC report(6) concludes that Communist terrorist methods in Hong Kong have, to a large extent, proved counter productive and have antagonised large sections of the public. The failure of the Communists to win popular support reduced their will and ability to gain a quick victory over the security forces, and at the end of 1967 Peking ordered a major policy change. This called for the abandonment of violence and the continuation of the struggle in Hong Kong by political means, The report further concludes that we are likely to get some warning of any further coordinated and systematic campaign of terrorism aimed at undermining public confidence. In the Colony itself any actual or rumoured changes in military strength would have an acute effect on local confidence which is indispensable to Hong Kong's economy and political viability.

6. Since CINCFE and CBF made their recommendations, the situation in Hong Kong has eased considerably. The intelligence assessment points to the failure of terrorism and the deliberate decision to switch to other means of working towards Communist objectives. There is thus no immediate need to evacuate families, and since the intelligence assessment indicates that we are likely to get some warning of any further outbreak of systematic terrorism, there are no real grounds at present to justify the immediate withdrawal of families and a change over to unaccompanied service. Should there be a resurgence of Billdrawal " spontaneous terrorism without warning, we may assume that

families.

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this could be dealt with without undue risk to families as indeed happened in 1967.

7. It might be argued that although the situation in Hong Kong has eased since CINCFE and CBF made their recommendations, a change to unaccompanied tours would be a useful insurance against the possibility of systematic terrorism in years to

The answer to this is that the penalties of such a change, which we outline below, are so serious that we should not accept them unless the trend of future events decisively

come.

afford a gred points to the need for it.

MILITARY FACTORS

Operational

8.

The removal of the bulk of the families would simplify the tasks which the garrison might have to undertake, though this should be kept in perspective. CINCFE's proposal implies removing from what is planned to be a wholly British garrison some 4,200 British women and children. But there would still remain about 3,200 dependants of the battalion on Hong Kong island and of the headquarters and administrative units, whom

Note:

6.

JIC(68)15

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