TNAG-0060-FCO40-96-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1968 — Page 188

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

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ANNEX A TO DOP 4/68 (Final)

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Beira Patrol and Persian Gulf Frigates

38. There is no present basis for the assumption that the Gulf frigates should become part of the Far East Fleet in mid-1969. Nevertheless we appreciate that it would help in making the most effective use of the ships available if COMFEF were made responsible for both the Gulf and Beira patrol commitments. It is more economic to meet the latter with ships on passage to and from the Far East, rather than the Gulf. Moreover the forthcoming substitution of LEANDER for TRIBAL class frigates in the Gulf may require periodic access to technical support facilities in Singapore which are not available in Bahrain. We consider that CBFG should be consulted about this.

Naval Control of Shipping

39. The best means of meeting our naval control of shipping requirements in the area are currently being studied by the Navy Department and it would be inappropriate to approach our allies on this subject until our own proposals have been evolved.

Dockyard

40. We believe it might not be practicable to run down the Dockyard in a period of nine months. It will probably be necessary, therefore, to make alternative assumptions for the start of the rundown, should the current negotiations for commercialisation be unsuccessful, to ensure that all facilities in the Navy Base are given up by the end of 1971.

Air Defence During Final Withdrawal

41. We note (7) that an Air Defence Advisory Group has been established and we agree that the Royal Air Force is to remain responsible for overall air defence of Malaysia and Singapore until towards the end of the withdrawal. Air defence during the final withdrawal will be exercised under the overall command of CINCFE, through an Air Defence Commander. We also agree that it is prudent to plan on a CVA Task Group being available in the area to cover the final withdrawal and to act as a deterrent force should an external threat arise. We further note that planning will be based on the assumption that a similar CVA Task Group will be required to cover the Gulf withdrawal. However, it may be difficult to provide a CVA in the Gulf and Singapore ooncurrently for an extended period.

United Nations Command Korea

42. We are advised that it would not be appropriate at the present time to negotiate the end of the Korean commitment whereby one ship, the Hong Kong Guardship, is declared in support of the United Nations Command in Korea. This matter is currently being examined with the Political departments.

Facilities in Mombasa

43 We are advised that facilities at Mombasa shoull be available to us during final withdrawal. But, at this stage of planning, this cannot be accepted as a firm assumption.

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