INTEGER
SECRET
ANNEX A TO DOP 4/68 (Final) (Continued)
We have also noted the list of problems and implications resulting from an accelerated rundown, which the Commander-in-Chief attached to his outline plan.
33. Our comments below are confined to matters of general policy. However, there are some aspects of the problems and implications posed by the Commander-in-Chief on which we are unable to give guidance at this stage. These will be clarified as our future policy evolves.
Relative Timings of the Withdrawals from the Gulf and Singapore
34. Our guidance (6) on the relative timings of the withdrawals from the Gulf and Singapore states that initial planning should be on the basis of a concurrent withdrawal from both areas, but emphasises that the greatest possible fl xibility in planning is required. This fundamental planning assumption should be taken into account in future detailed planning.
Stability in the Area
35. We consider that the pattern of the rundown will be determined by the need to maintain conditions of stability during the period up to our planned departure in December 1971, and would not in itself be affected by what occurs thereafter. However, we are advised that it would be in United Kingdom interests to participate in effective co-operation in defence matters between Commonwealth countries concerned, in order to preserve this stability after our withdrawal.
Commonwealth Co-operation
36. We note with satisfaction that should the Australian and/or the New Zealand Government decide to maintain a military presence in Malaysia after 1st April 1970, it will still be possible to provide assistance, on a repayment basis, during the transitional period. This could mitigate some of the ill-effects of our early withdrawal, However, we understand that the scope of the support entailed may be more than Australia and New Zealand would be prepared to undertake.
37.
We further note the need for early action in respect of initiating discussions on the organisation of the naval and mari- time defence of Malaysia and Singapore, and the joint control of the Naval Base Waters. CINCFE has subsequently set up a Naval Advisory Working Group for this purpose, and has also set up an Army Advisory Working Group to advise him on matters of Army organisation and training best suited to the future needs of Malaysia and Singapore. We therefore envisage a situation in which it may be necessary to continue to provide seconded personnel or a training team after withdrawal to either the Malaysian or Singaporean Governments, or both, to assist in the final defence arrangements in the area.
Note:
6. COSSEA 28
A - 6
SECRET
INTEGER
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.