TNAG-0060-FCO40-96-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1968 — Page 172

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ANNEX A to DP 9/68(C) (Draft) (Continued)

Singapore, the permanent garrison should be 73 major units.

We now

re-examine this decision in the light of the accelerated withdrawal

with a view to establishing the garrison at a permanent strength of 63 major units, and relying on air reinforcement capability to deploy

the immediate reserve battalion from the United Kingdom.

23. The timely reinforcement of the garrison from the United Kingdom

is dependent on sufficient warning being received, the necessary air

routes being available, no delay in over-flight clearances being en-

countered and no simultaneous major air transport operation taking

place elsewhere.

battalion could be brought to 24 hours notice to move and would be

deployed from the United Kingdom to Hong Kong within a further 48 hours

using the Westabout route, or within 36 hours using the CENTO route.

24. The movement of a further three battalions, whilst dependent

upon the same availability of air routes, diplomatic clearance and

no simultaneous major air transport operation, is less dependent

on the warning period. A second battalion, providing it is brought

to 24 hours notice when the decision is made to despatch the first

battalion, could follow up and arrive in Hong Kong within a further

48 hours Westabout, or 36 hours using the CENTO route. Should it be

necessary to continue the reinforcement build-up to a total of four

battalions, the additional two battalions would be despatched as

circumstances required, and could be deployed within 8 days Westabout

or 7 days using the CENTO route. The pre-stocking of unit equipment

in Hong Kong to the appropriate scale is a pre-requisite for rein-

forcement within these timings.

Given such circumstances, the first reinforcing

25. Thus in theory, the immediate reserve battalion could be pro-

vided in time from the United Kingdom, if the above conditions can

be met and assuming sufficient warning of a deteriorating situation

is received. However, we are conscious of the rapidity with which an

internal security situation in the colony has developed in the past

and could do so again in the future, bearing in mind the assessment

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