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ANNEX A to DP 9/68(C) (Draft) (Continued)
to the increased length of passage time, the reinforcement
required in times of tension can only be met if a second frigate
reamins within a few days steaming of Hong Kong.
The further
requirement to keep two MCM vessels at operational readiness,
together with two further MCM vessels available in times of
tension, can only be met by basing them on Hong Kong.
19.
With the loss of fleet maintenance facilities at Singapore,
a small increase will be required in the facilities at HMS TAMAR.
The provision of one small tanker/stores ship will also be required
to support these ships.
20.
Army
21.
Our minimum force requirements are therefore summarised as:
2.
Two frigates. One as guardship (also declared ship
to United Nations Command in South Korea), one as reserve.
b. Five MCM vessels. Two at operational readiness for
two as reinforcement; one undergoing maintenance.
One small tanker/stores ship.
patrol;
C.
ã•
HMS TAMAR.
Small increase in base facilities amounting
to about 42 personnel.
We
The Commander-in-Chief's outline plan (12) for the rundown
and total withdrawal from Malaysia, Singapore and Prunei assumes
that he will be unable to meet commitments to our dependencies,
including Hong Kong, after 1st September 1971 at the latest.
have agreed with this assumption and, as a consequence, reinforçe-
ments for Hong Kong to a possible maximum strength of 10 major
units will subsequently have to come from the United Kingdom.
However we recognise that in the event of trouble in the Persian
Gulf or Singapore during our planned withdrawals, the Commander-
in-Chief, Far East may have to relinquish his responsibility for
the reinforcement of Hong Kong before 1st September 1971.
22.
We had previously agreed (13) with the proposal of the Commander-
in-Chief that after the withdrawal of our forces from Malaysia and
Notes:
12.
CINCFE 7/68 dated 14th February 1968 13. cos 75th Mtg/67
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