TNAG-0060-FCO40-96-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1968 — Page 130

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ANNEX A to DP 9/68(C) (Directors Draft)

(Continued)

recommendation (16) that as long as Commander Far East Fleet and

Commander Fare East Air Force remain in Singapore, they would

continue to exercise single service responsibility for naval

and air forces in Hong Kong in support of Commander British

Forces. Towards the end of 1971, all forces in the Hong Kong

operational area will come under the operational command of the

Commander British Forces who will delegate operational control

to his single service commanders as applicable.

Operational

38. At the same time the Naval and air forces in Hong Kong will

cease to be administered from Singapore and this responsibility

would then be undertaken from the United Kingdom.

control will have to be exercised locally. A small RAF

operations staff may have to be established at the Headquarters

of Commander British Forces Hong Kong.

39. The re-establishment of a resident naval and air presence in

Hong Kong offers an opportunity to review the command organisation

in the colony for the period after 1971.

COSTS

40. The costs of our proposals above those of the present

permanent garrison will be about £3.38M in annual budgetary terms,

of which £0.68M is in addition to the provision made in the

calculations for long term costings for 1972/73 force levels (the

"Four Day Costing Exercise"). The extra foreign exchange cost

would be about £1.34M. These figures do not include the costs

of the three additional MCM (V)s or the five Hunter aircraft, which

we suggest should be met by the Hong Kong Government.

detailed breakdown of costs, and manpower is shown at Appendix.

The

41.

We conclude that:

CONCLUSIONS

a. Despite the lull in confrontation resulting from a change in tactics by the Chinese Communists, we can

Note:

16.

SEACOS 153 (1967)

A 14

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