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ANNEX A to DP 9/68(C)
Directors' Draft (Continued)
21. It might be considered appropriate for the Hong Kong
Government to be invited to meet the cost of stationing the
additional MCM (V)s in the Colony.
Army
22.
The Commander-in-Chief's outline plan (12) for the rundown and
total withdrawal from Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei, assumes that he will be unable to meet commitments to our dependencies,
including Hong Kong, after 1st September 1971 at the latest.
We have agreed with this assumption and, as a consequence, reinforce- ments to bring Hong Kong to a possible maximum strength of 103
major units will subsequently have to come from the United Kingdom.
However, we recognise that in the event of trouble in the Persian
Gulf or Singapore during our planned withdrawals, the Commander-
in-Chief, Far East may have to relinquish his responsibility for
the reinforcement of Hong Kong before 1st September 1971.
23. We had previously agreed (13) with the proposal of the
Commander-in-Chief that after the withdrawal of our forces from
of Hong Kong Malaysia and Singapore, the permanent garrison/should be 7 major
units. We now re-examine this decision in the light of the
accelerated withdrawal with a view to establishing the size of
the permanent garrison relying on air reinforcement capability to
deploy the immediate reserve batalion from the United Kingdom.
24.
The timely reinforcement of the garrison from the United
Kingdom is dependent on sufficient warning being received;
necessary air routes being available; no delay in over-flight
clearances being encountered; and no simultaneous major air
transport operating taking place elsewhere. Given such circum-
stances, the first reinforcing battelion could be brought to 24
hours notice to move and would be deployed from the United Kingdom
Notes:
12. CINCFE 7/68 dated 14 13. COS 75th Mtg/67
February 1968
the
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