TNAG-0060-FCO40-96-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1968 — Page 124

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

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ANNEX A to DP 9/68(C) (Directors Draft (Continued)

intention to maintain a military presence in the Colony.

RATIONALE FOR FUTURE FORCE LEVELS

Royal Navy.

18.

The requirement already established to keep one frigate

permanent ly in Hong Kong will have to be met from the Western

Fleet, after the withdrawal of the Far East Fleet from Singapore.

Owing to the increased length of passage time, the reinforcement

required in times of tension can only be met if a second frigate

remains within a few days steaming of Hong Kong. One of these

hay

frigages wiT also continue to be declared to the United Nations

Command Korea; this commitment is currently under review by

political departments.

The further requirement to keep two MCM

vessels at operational readiness, together with two further MCM

vessels available in times of tension, can only be met by basing

them on Hong Kong.

19. With the loss of Singapore based fleet maintenance and

logistic facilities the following increases will be required in

Hong Kong:

20.

a. A small increase in personnel and stores in HMS TAMAR.

7.

The provision of one small tanker to guard against the

loss of commercial shore fuel facilities through strike

action or subversion and to support the UN command frigate

if deployed.

Our minimum force requirements are therefore summarised as:

a.

Two frigates. One as guardship (also declared ship

to United Nations Command in South Korea), one as rotnforcement.

10.

Five MCM vessels. Two at operational readiness for

patrol; two as reinforcement;

one undergoing maintenance.

C.

One small tanker/ship.

d.

HMS TAMAR. Small increase in base facilities.

A 8

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