TNAG-0060-FCO40-96-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1968 — Page 120

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ANNEX A to DP 9/68(C)

Directors' Draft (Continued)

patrols to prevent the influx of refugees by sea and

to contribute to the control of piracy and smuggling.

C.

Limited shore support facilities at HMS TAMAR.

The remainder of the Far East Fleet, based on Singapore, is

available for reinforcement of the Hong Kong garrison.

Army

6. The present force of 7 major units, including one reinforcing

infantry battalion, is justified by a concept of operations which

provides the capability to contain an internal security situation.

This in turn is linked to our ability to control the frontier,

in order to prevent the situation being aggrevated by an influx of

large numbers of inflitrators or refugees. To fail in this would,

apart from other consequences, present the Chinese with a pretext

for military intervention.

7. Furthermore, if we are to continue to implement our present

policy to expose any Chinese incursion into the colony by armed force

as an act of aggression, it is necessary to provide a screen on

the frontier composed of all arms. This must be strong enough to

identify overt aggression by making Chinese forces crossing the

frontier deploy and carry out co-ordinated military attacks.

8. Our most recent examination (6) of forces required for the

garrison was made in 1966, before the recent emergency in the

Colony. We then concluded that the permanent Army garrison

required was 63 major units, of which two battalions should be

The tasks for these forces were as follows:

Internal security duties in the New Territories

British.

a.

and external defence on the frontier: two infantry

battalions and 1 supporting units, comprising one light

regiment, one armoured car squadron, and one engineer

squadron.

b.

Internal security duties in Kowloon: two infantry

battalions.

Note: 6.

COS 119/66

A - 4

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