TNAG-0060-FCO40-96-Strength-of-Hong-Kong-garrison-1968 — Page 119

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

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ANNEX A to DP 9/68(C) (Directors (Continued)

Peking would therefore try to ensure that such a

campaign was regulated so as to avoid the disadvantages

attendant on serious economic decline or collapse.

f.

A policy of moderation could quickly be reversed,

particularly if the Culteral Revolution flared up

again with a resurgence of extremism, although at

present this seems unlikely. But if it did, it could

The

create a heightened danger of direct action against Hong

Kong either deliberately, or by miscalculation.

danger of action by the Chinese aimed at taking over

Hong Kong may increase as the economic importance of Hong

Kong to China declined.

g. One factor Peking will have in mind is that any

British decision to reduce the size of the garrison,

coupled with the accelerated withdrawal of the British

military presence from the Far East, could in due course

have an acute effect on local and in particular police

morale, and thus on the position of the Hong Kong Government.

PRESENT FORCE LEVELS AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Royal Navy

5.

The present forces to meet current tasks are:

a. One frigate, reinforced by an additional frigate

from the Far East Command in times of tension, to give

added support to maritime police patrols and to act as

a deterrent to Chinese Communist Navy interference and

local piracy. This ship also constitutes the United

Kingdom naval contribution to the United Nations Command

in South Korea.

b. Two mine countermeasures (MCM) vessels, on rotation

from Singapore, reinforced by two additional vessels in

times of tension for direct support of maritime police

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