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simplification of the factors and issues is dangerous. Whatever the explanation of the Sha Tau Kok and Lo Wu incidents, certain facts are common ground. The first is that the People's Liberation Army (ie the regular Communist Chinese Army) is the authority wielding power in Kwantung Province. The second is that it has taken measures to improve its ability to keep the situation on the frontier under control. Its motives for doing so are no doubt mixed.
The extent to which, even if it wished to, it could absolutely prevent or prohibit all demonstrations otc on or near the frontier is no doubt limited by the political and emotional factors which affect its actions (or apparent inaction) all over China. The consensus of opinion seems to be that it is in pretty firm control and that it is employing this to prevent rather than to promote trouble on the frontier. However, it must not be overlooked that this situation puts it in a better position than before to take military action quickly and without warning. The presence of the PLA or of the militia in ovident strength on the frontier, combined with the after-effects of the incidents which occurrod there, have made it essential to ensure that military forces are seen to be present on our side also. Unless they are, the police and the population will not go near it, and morale throughout the New Territories is endangered. At the time of my visit provision of this presence involved two Gurkha battalions. There is no doubt in my view that, provided the situation on the frontier remains as it is, this task can be performed adequately by one battalion group. The main difficulty in achieving this is to make this reduction without adversely affecting police morale and public confidence and giving the impression to the PLA that we are weakening.
Adequacy of Forces
7.
The external threat is likely therefore to absorb at least one battalion group permanently. If it was not actively deployed, it would have to be available for deployment at short notice, which comes to the same thing. If the external situation deteriorates, the task of facing it would absorb two battalions and all the supporting arms of 48 Brigade, leaving only one battalion of the Brigade available for internal security either in New Territories, which is very short of police, or as a reserve for Kowloon. Kowloon itself has one British battalion, as has Hong Kong Island. As a reservo for both, they share the Gurkha battalion recently sent as a reinforcement, located at RAF Kai Tak with two companies elsewhere in Kowloon itself.
8.
If the situation on the frontier remains as it is and the internal situation does not seriously deteriorate, I believe this to be adequate. It is true that Hong Kong Island itself could absorb two battalions and Kowloon threc. If at the same time both the external situation and the internal situation in the New Territories had deteriorated to the same degree, 48 Gurkha Brigade's resources would be fully committed and they might possibly even require a fourth battalion. If this also were provided, the total reinforcement to the normal garrison of 6 2/3 army units would have risen to four battalions. an addition would inevitably demand some increase in logistic and administrative strengthe, and a brigade headquarters at a limited establishment, would be needed to command the troops in Hong Kong Island, leaving HQ Hong Kong and Kowloon Garrison free to deal solely with Kowloon.
Such
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