SECRET
are owned by the CPG, such as the Bank of China, the China Travel Agency, the National Resources Company, the New China News Agency and a few local newspapers. Direct attack on these could have undesirable consequences in two ways. It could implicate the CPG directly more than they themselves might wish and certainly more than is desirable from our point of view, thus escalating the whole "confrontation". It could also cut the only links through which sensible and useful contacts with the authorities of mainland China are maintained, to the detriment of Hong Kong itself in several fields, for instance that of water supply.
4. The second of these limiting factors is the danger that successful police action against the fairly primitive methods now employed by the trouble-makers may drive them both to more sophisticated tactics and also to greater direct dependence on mainland China. The two are interconnected in that the most dangerous tactics, terrorist attacks against prominent individuals or isolated targets, would probably require better weapons, better training and better organisation, which are not easily provided from resources within the Colony. threat of this nature would be very difficult to counter. would greatly complicate the task of the police, even if given full help from the military. If they did not appear to be getting it under control quickly, the confidence of the public and of the police themselves could quickly fail. If police morale and public confidence could not be restored, no amount of military force could save the situation.
A
It
5. It is clear that the internal situation is the key to the problem, and that the maintenance of public confidence and police morale are vital factors in it. The employment of troops in support of the police, and the knowledge that they are quickly available in sufficient strength, is an essential adjunct, which has been and must be brought into play before police morale and public confidence waver. At the same time the impression must not be given that the police are completely dependent on military support, that the military have in any way taken over, or that draconian measures are being taken which are not fully supported by the great majority of the public. The situation is aggravated by the existence of a pool of disaffected communist sympathisers, unemployed as a result of their dismissal for participating in the strikes which the communist unions called earlier on. They provide the "masses" readily available for manipulation by the organisers of trouble. If local business confidence falters, this pool of unemployment will grow.
At the time of my visit, the series of police actions carried out over the preceding ten days had undoubtedly resulted in an improvement in the situation. However, until the reaction from Peking and locally in Hong Kong is seen, it is premature to judge how the situation will develop. There is unlikely to be a drastic improvement and everybody expects that trouble will continue, probably for a long time. If it does, it must change in form, which could clearly be more violent and difficult to deal with.
The External Situation
6. The internal situation is affected by and also itself affects the situation on and near the frontier. It is here that the China-watchers come into their own and that any
2
SECRET
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.