TNAG-0055-FCO40-91-Defence-review-1977 — Page 85

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24. The presence of our forces deters military confrontation between Singapore and Malaysia. Once they are gone Singapore might be tempted to protect herself both by building up her armaments and by intriguing with the Malaysian Chinese. Her enbarking on either course could provide a pretext for Malaysia to pre-empt the situation by attempting to take Singapore over. This affects the question of military aid to both

countries which is discussed in paragraphs 55-56 below.

SEATO Powers

(a) France

25. Since France is not to be represented at the SEATO meeting, and since she is only a sleeping partner in the alliance, it will be unnecessary to nake any special provision for her. On the other hand there might be some advantage in HM Ambassador in Paris explaining our intentions in general terms at some suitable time, since our actions could be appropriately presented as an indication of our desire to concentrate upon Europe. This would require further study, since there could be a

danger that the French might wish to "leak" the decision.

(b) Thailand and Philippines

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26. Our intention to withdraw would be thoroughly unwelcome to both

Thailand and the Philippines. They would equate the United Kingdom as a SEATO power with France and Pakistan, and they would further consolidate round the United States as the only power capable of ensuring their

security and independence. SEATO might thus well become an adjunct to the Vietnam war, The Thais would be likely to ask us about our abili y

to commit our forces under SEATO Plan 4, and although we could probably

say, in the initial stages, that this was one of the matters which would

have to be studied, in the long run we should have to explain our inability

to fulfil the commitment. Both Thailand and the Philippines would tend

to write us off as an influence in the Far East, and we could not escape

some short-term damage to our commercial interests, in an expanding

market, especially in the field of governmental contracts, We could to

some extent offset these sentiments if we were able to give both these

•ountries more economic aid, If our own financial position makes this

difficult we should at least show, in our public statements and especially

in our attitude at SEATO meetings, a sympathetic understanding of the

aspirations of the countries of East Asia toward regional co-operation and economic development; and we should make it clear that, to the extent that

our means allow, we shall actively support then in these objectives.

(97793)

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