CINCFE.1511/6130/18
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needed and we would have to negotiate alternative logistic support plans with our allies. As en example of the size of the logistic tasks the following details of stocks hold in the Singapore base were given:-
90 days Mar Haintenance Reserve Project Stores
IS stockpile for a Brigado
licintenance Stocks
90 days stocks for SENTO commitments
The biggest dividend to be obtained from a reduction of tooth arns would be to run down the Gurkha strongth in Singapore to 6,000. This might enable us to retain more teeth arms for the Coamonwealth Brigade but some reductions would be essential. The best dividend would be to run down Gurkhas to 6,000 coupled with a reduction of Commonwealth Brigade tooth arms and relief from Plan 4 and 8 SATO commitments. From 1971 onwards the military presence in this area could be the Comundo Brigado, If this could be accepted then 50% cut in land forces in Malaysia/Singapore could be achieved by the end of 1971. It could not be achieved before because the 6,000 figure for Gurkhas would not be reached until October 1971. The ARMY COMINDER explained that, under current plans, two major units have to be sunt from Singapore to Hong Kong in an emergency. A new reinforcement plan for Hong Kong would be necessary if tooth arms in blaysia/ Singapore are withdrawn: it might be necessary to increase the permanent garrison in Hong Kong to 73 units. Beyond 1971, a major policy decision will be required concerning British participation in the Commonwealth Brigado. Until final withdrawal from the mainland of Asin (if this is decided upon) it was essential that the Commando Brigade rernins for IS duties and to protect British equipment and personnel. In answer to questions after the Army Commander's statement, the following points were rede:-
(1) Even with a very early decision to reduce our SEATO commitments, it is extremely unlikely that any significant cuts could be made between now and 1st April 1968, Units must be given six months warning of withdrawal.
(2) It was not possible to compare our speedy withdrawal from Borneo with possible withdrawal of forces from illaysia/ Singapore. Forces in Bornco wore on unaccompanied service. in temporary barracks, oto and they have only field-force logistio support.
(3) SANTO force declaration, as such, is not a problem: our accepted commitments under Plans 4 and 8 arc.
(4) The withdrawal of tooth units would not necessarily result in proportional reductions in logistic support units.
(5) It would not be possible to advance the Army's proposed reductions during 1968/69 to 1967/68.
(6) Under existing agrooponts, Plan 4 forces are responsible for providing their own logistic support with the exception of POL which is provided by the US. Unless we could persuado the US to take over logistic support beyong roar boundaries we could not expect any improvement in this field.
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