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CINCTE.1511/6130/18
C.
UK EYES ONLY
(7) There was no agreed werning period for SENTO plans, but the basis of Plan 4 was the required deployment of the Com vn- wealth Brigade, to be operational in Thailand by S + 11. If the logistic support had to be deployed from the UK, a period of about four months would be needed before we would be in a position to make an effective contribution in Thailand. Jo would have to consult our allies if this longer period was required to deploy our forces in a Plan 4 or 8 situation.
(8) The min problen ooncerning our SIMTO commitments contres round the future of the Commonwealth Brigado and the Stratogic Reserve Air Forces.
The AIR COMANDER said that, as a result of reorganisation, FIT had already been reduced by 1,500. The strength of the RAF in Singapore and Halaysia was to be reduced to 9,700 by April 1968 and the current strength is down to 9,800. Host of the factors affecting the RF rundown would depend on policy decisions. If we were to retain our SHATO and Strategic Reserve commitments a sizeable Air Force would be needed. The shape of FAT would, to some extent, depend on the pattern of Arry and RN forces retained in the Far East. However, even with a 50% reduction, FEF should have no great difficulty in supporting SHATO as now, To offect a 50% roduction, it would be necessary to close one station (probably Seletar). If Seletar was closed for flying certain support units would have to remain but it might be possible to offer part of the station for use by the other Services as an coonomy measure. Two airfields would be needed in Singapore. Tongáh would be the main RW base with Changi as a transport terminal with, again, the possibility of accommodation for the other Services. It might be possible to get the Australians to take over the support side of Butterworth, currently an RAF commitment, but the numbers saved would be small owing to the need to man the radar at Wostorn Hill and the Karino Craft unit. The re-equipment programme for the For East Air Force night be altered to produce a manpower saving but it would soon unwise at this late stage to stop the Lightnings end Hercules coming to the Far East. The ECH (Canberra) Squadron could be stopped but this decision must be made quickly as it is due here in August 1967. Looking to the seventies, the AIR CONVADIR said that it would be sensible to retain US aircraft as provision had been inade for spares from America and those would be available from the USAF in the Far East. Wo might well be able to reach some arrangenents with the Americans for them to provide logistic support and so avoid the necessity for largo stockpiles of aircraft stores in Far East Command. Because of the ro-cquipment programme there is plenty of flexibility in the shape our air forces can take in the seventies. Replying to a question fron the Secretary of State, I DAVIS, the Command Secretary, FEIF said that civilian staff amounted to about 40% of the total HMF strength.
a. The COUND SECRETARY, FARULF, HR STIRLING, said the number of unemployed persons in Singapore at the end of February was 76,000 - sonothing of the order of 12 to 14 por oont of the working population. To that figure the Goverment expected to add about 12,000 school- loavors onch year for whom jobs could not be found. The position in Malaysia was no better, and there sooned little likelihood of any significant improvement there. The Singapore and Malaysian Governments know that, following a re-assessment of our post-confrontation manpower requirements, the Services and HPBW had in contemplation redundancy amounting to upwards of 1,200 civilians overall. Of these about
/1,000
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