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48. In these circumstances either our oversea policies must be radically
changed or some lesser saving by 1970-71 must be accepted.
Officials need
further guidance on this. Any reductions in the Far East must be first
discussed with our allies; we are bound by treaty to do so with Malaysia.
We are likely to want to make an announcement about force levels in
Germany in the early summer, and if we are to give an indication at the
same time about our deployment in the Far East, we shall have to begin consultations very soon, Broad decisions on our force deployment in the Far East are therefore urgent.
49. We consider that there are three possible approaches to reductions in the Far East. First, reductions of the order of about half, the precise nature of which would depend on consultations with our allies and further studies. Secondly, the maintenance of a minimum presence, using facilities in Australia; and thirdly, total withdrawal from the theatre. We cannot judge the consequences for the total size and shape of our forces, nor estimate the budgetary savings, of total withdrawal without further study. The consequences for our oversea policy would in present circumstances be
severe. A minimum presence in Australia would be politically more accept- able to our allies than total withdrawal and the United States in particular would much prefer it; but our allies would raise very great difficulties since they would feel that our departure from Singapore and Malaysia would threaten the stability of the area. The American attitude would be coloured by their
involvement in Vietnam. The size of the civilian redundancies would make it
wholly unacceptable to Singapore.
However, these difficulties would be less
at a later stage, particularly after the end of the conflict in Vietnam.
50. In any case there are very great practical difficulties in withdrawing from Singapore and Malaysia by 1970-71. These include the Gurkhas, and the problems involved in reshaping our own forces and in accommodating them in the United Kingdom until disbandments could be made and in the disposal of our facilities and stores. These problems alone would mean that our withdrawal would have to be phased over at least five years. The practical limitations on the speed of our withdrawal are much more severe if we accept the need to withdraw in an orderly manner without leaving chaos behind. There is already likely, regardless of any further British cuts, to be an unemployment rate of 17 per cent in Singapore in 1970. We would be bound to be under great pressure to spread redundancies over the longest possible period.
51. These practical considerations remove much of the distinction in fact between the initial stages of a gradual reduction of our forces and those of complete withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore. The Singapore Government expect us to stay at Defence Review strength until 1971 but have said that they cannot be certain of our remaining ten years hence. This is not long after the earliest date, some time in the early 1970s, at which we could complete an orderly evacuation of the base.
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