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52. The oversea political Departments feel therefore that the most
realistic course is to pursue as large a reduction as we can gain acceptance
to in the near future, being ready to take advantage of any opportunity of making further reductions as it arises. Even if our objective is complete withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia, this is the most effective course
which will lead eventually to that objective. It means probably limiting
our target, and particularly the announcement of a target, at this stage to
making reductions of about one half,
53. The Department of Economic Affairs and the Treasury, however, feel that there are dangers in this course. At best it would mean postponing complete withdrawal until about 1976; at worst we might have to give under-
takings precluding further withdrawal for a much longer period. They consider that we should inform our allies that we propose to complete our withdrawal early in the 1970s.
54. The Ministry of Defence view is that if we are to withdraw completely from Singapore and Malaysia in good order we need to take the decision in principle now, at least for internal purposes, and set a target date. We have to plan for many years ahead on the roles, equipment, organisation and accommodation of the forces. For planning purposes we should assume that withdrawal would be complete by 1975-76, this being the earliest date possible in view of the practical considerations; and that thereafter we should have small military forces in Australia, using Australian facilities.
55. We cannot plan any reductions in detail nor assess their budgetary or economic effects without local consultations. The sooner these start, the sooner we can achieve the savings and the longer we shall have to mitigate their effect by phasing thon over several years. We shall be pressed to reveal our hand at a series of forthcoming international meetings starting in early April and in particular at the SEATO meeting on 18th to 20th April.
56. Ministerial decisions are required on our objectives before our negotiating position can be worked out. We shall however have to say more than simply that we intend to make reductions. The choices before Ministers therefore are first, whether we should seek and announce early total with- drawal from the Far East. The Working Party as a whole does not recommend this course. The choice between the two remaining courses, which are to withdraw completely from Malaysia and Singapore and to maintain a minimum
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