TNAG-0055-FCO40-91-Defence-review-1977 — Page 104

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POLITICO/MILITARY AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF FAR EAST FORCE REDUCTIONS

Report by Officials

The attached report by the Defence Review Working Party sets out, so far as the information at present available permits, the politico/military

and economic implications of the conclusion of the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee that we should seek to reduce our forces in Singapore/

Malaysia by about half by 1970-71, with total withdrawal not later than

1975-76 with a possible military presence in the Far East outside Hong Kong limited to small maritime and air forces using facilities in Australia. The report, which is summarised in paragraphs 65-75, shows that much of the information necessary to a final decision in June/July will only become

available after some consultation with our allies. Details of the military

consequences, including the maritime and air presence that we might maintain

in the longer term in the Far East, still need to be worked out. These

cannot be sensibly determined until there have been close investigations both on the spot and with the other Governments concerned. At some stage in the

course of these discussions we should have to make plain that our force

declarations to SEATO would have to be drastically modified as would our

military support for Malaysia and Singapore. We should also need to discuss the future of the Commonwealth Brigade (which is likely to cause special difficulty) and the forces which Australia and New Zealand might wish to see us

base in Australia. As a result of these discussions it will become possible

to decide the force levels and facilities that will be required in the United

Kingdom and to work out the large scale re-deployment and reorganisation for

the Services that the new policy will involve. The amount, nature, tining

and conditions of aid, development, military and budgetary, that it will be right to offer Singapore/Malaysia cannot be adequately assessed except after

full discussion with those Governments; the strength and direction of the

reaction of our allies can only be broadly estimated at this state; and the

degree to which we may think it desirable to offer aid to other countries in the area (including Nepal) as a contribution to general stability can be assessed only in the long term. Our recommendations are consequently

directed primarily to the initial round of consultations with our allies.

Our aim is to take by the middle of the year decisions to halve our forces in Singapore/Malaysia by 1970-71 and to withdraw from the mainland of Asia (apart from Hong Kong) no later than 1975-76. To achieve this most

effectively, the process of consultation with our allies must be seen to be

genuine; within this framework, we should adapt the details of our reduced

military dispositions and our aid to the best mutual advantage, and by

-i-

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