(97793)
TOP SECRET
POLITICO/MILITARY AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF FAR EAST FORCE REDUCTIONS
Report by Officials
The attached report by the Defence Review Working Party sets out, so far as the information at present available permits, the politico/military
and economic implications of the conclusion of the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee that we should seek to reduce our forces in Singapore/
Malaysia by about half by 1970-71, with total withdrawal not later than
1975-76 with a possible military presence in the Far East outside Hong Kong limited to small maritime and air forces using facilities in Australia. The report, which is summarised in paragraphs 65-75, shows that much of the information necessary to a final decision in June/July will only become
available after some consultation with our allies. Details of the military
consequences, including the maritime and air presence that we might maintain
in the longer term in the Far East, still need to be worked out. These
cannot be sensibly determined until there have been close investigations both on the spot and with the other Governments concerned. At some stage in the
course of these discussions we should have to make plain that our force
declarations to SEATO would have to be drastically modified as would our
military support for Malaysia and Singapore. We should also need to discuss the future of the Commonwealth Brigade (which is likely to cause special difficulty) and the forces which Australia and New Zealand might wish to see us
base in Australia. As a result of these discussions it will become possible
to decide the force levels and facilities that will be required in the United
Kingdom and to work out the large scale re-deployment and reorganisation for
the Services that the new policy will involve. The amount, nature, tining
and conditions of aid, development, military and budgetary, that it will be right to offer Singapore/Malaysia cannot be adequately assessed except after
full discussion with those Governments; the strength and direction of the
reaction of our allies can only be broadly estimated at this state; and the
degree to which we may think it desirable to offer aid to other countries in the area (including Nepal) as a contribution to general stability can be assessed only in the long term. Our recommendations are consequently
directed primarily to the initial round of consultations with our allies.
Our aim is to take by the middle of the year decisions to halve our forces in Singapore/Malaysia by 1970-71 and to withdraw from the mainland of Asia (apart from Hong Kong) no later than 1975-76. To achieve this most
effectively, the process of consultation with our allies must be seen to be
genuine; within this framework, we should adapt the details of our reduced
military dispositions and our aid to the best mutual advantage, and by
-i-
TOP SECRET