TNAG-0052-FCO40-88-Communist-activities-in-schools-1968 — Page 116

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(b)

(c)

(a)

(e)

Peking is likely to feel particularly sensitive about the restriction of the style of education which the regime in China is advocating and promoting at present.

With the exception of the emergency closure of a school (described as Course A in Appendix E) it is not likely that 'provocative' action can be taken by us before

December 15th, the end of the Canton Fair. Thus any assessment of the likely external effects for other options described

in this paper are probably best delayed until the situation can be appraised after this date.

The timing of any policy would need to be cleared in London in view of Britain's continuing efforts to find ways of reaching a detente with China.

It would be useful to consider the reactions of communists in Macau to the effort of Catholic Schools to restrain revolutionary activities in schools.

7.

(a)

(b)

(c)

POSSIBLE AIMS

to disrupt the leadership of communist schools by the arrest and detention of key personnel.

to discover and eliminate subversive and unacceptable political activities within schools.

to eradicate the extreme-communist control of schools known to be encouraging subversive acts.

"Disrupt Leadership" Aim

8.

(a)

This aim would allow communist schools as such to continue, but without the direction of those who follow or allow school policies unacceptable to Government.

(b)

(c)

(a)

(e)

This is the policy successfully followed in respect of communist unions, and could be applied over the whole range of the confrontation.

It would harass the communists by causing organisational and morale problems and thus reduce their preparedness to indulge in subversive activities in schools.

There would be hue and cry, great propaganda play on "suppression", perhaps comfort missions, overt demonstrations and great hostility should inspections of involved schools follow. The case of the Hon Wah School provides an illustration of the reactions when just one key person was arrested.

Almost certainly subsequent arrests of new leadership or riotous students would become necessary.

(f)

This aim is not recommended as being the only

policy towards communist-controlled schools: it is best used in the confrontation as a whole, rather than against just one section of the opposition.

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