TNAG-0046-FCO40-82-Britain-s-entry-into-EEC-effect-on-trade-with-Hong-Kong-1967 — Page 27

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38.

One theoretical possibility would be to ask for a joint declaration in the first instance,

but be ready to fall back on the idea of a

unilateral declaration if we encountered strong

opposition.

course, is that the Six would be more suspicious

of what lay behind a unilateral declaration, if

it were suggested after a proposal for a joint

declaration had fallen to the ground, than if it

had been suggested in the first place.

The danger in this tactic, of

(c) If there were to be a declaration, should it

relate only to Hong Kong, or to U.K. Dependent Territories generally?

Here, much would depend on whether the declar-

ation was to be joint or unilateral.

If it was

to be joint, the Six would be likely to prefer to

limit its application as far as possible, and

therefore to press for it to be related to Hong

Kong alone. They would have strong grounds for

arguing on these lines, as they would probably be

in a position to say that they were making special

arrangements for all other British Dependent

Territories anyway, so their probleme were cared

for. The Chinese might not be pleased by a

Community declaration on Hong Kong alone; but

we would probably have to choose between irrit-

ating them in this way and giving up the prospect

of a joint declaration. If, on the other hand,

the declaration were to be unilateral, the Six,

if they agreed to it being made at all, would no

doubt be willing to give us a somewhat freer hand

as regards its substance.

If, after hearing these comments, Hong Kong officials con-

tinued to press the idea of a Declaration upon us, we could

agree to submit it to U.K. Ministers;

but we should not

/attempt

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