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38.
One theoretical possibility would be to ask for a joint declaration in the first instance,
but be ready to fall back on the idea of a
unilateral declaration if we encountered strong
opposition.
course, is that the Six would be more suspicious
of what lay behind a unilateral declaration, if
it were suggested after a proposal for a joint
declaration had fallen to the ground, than if it
had been suggested in the first place.
The danger in this tactic, of
(c) If there were to be a declaration, should it
relate only to Hong Kong, or to U.K. Dependent Territories generally?
Here, much would depend on whether the declar-
ation was to be joint or unilateral.
If it was
to be joint, the Six would be likely to prefer to
limit its application as far as possible, and
therefore to press for it to be related to Hong
Kong alone. They would have strong grounds for
arguing on these lines, as they would probably be
in a position to say that they were making special
arrangements for all other British Dependent
Territories anyway, so their probleme were cared
for. The Chinese might not be pleased by a
Community declaration on Hong Kong alone; but
we would probably have to choose between irrit-
ating them in this way and giving up the prospect
of a joint declaration. If, on the other hand,
the declaration were to be unilateral, the Six,
if they agreed to it being made at all, would no
doubt be willing to give us a somewhat freer hand
as regards its substance.
If, after hearing these comments, Hong Kong officials con-
tinued to press the idea of a Declaration upon us, we could
agree to submit it to U.K. Ministers;
but we should not
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