encouragement of subversion and violence among local
Consunista and their supporters, together with a clear
indication of China's support in the shape of inspired
and organised border incidents, infiltration or trained
terrorist unite, etc. It is not inconosivable that
continuing physical pressure by local Communists over a
prolonged period would, even without direct support from
China, make our position impossible - not so much becouse
we might lose the battle for the minds and hearts of the
Chinese pepuistion and control or internal security, but
bedsuse economie disruption and, above all, loss of
business confidence within and without the Colony might
slowly sop ita sconosic health, But the last few months
have shown that, in the absence of my sign that China.
intends to end our rule in Bong Kong, local confidence and
the confidence of the outside world have not been
seriously impaired.
Hader. Problems of vithdrawal,
5.
First and foremost of those will be the discharge of
our responsibilities to British subjects and foreig
nationals resident in the Colony and to British and foreign
assets there, Secondly there will be the problems of
maintaining internal security after the decision to
with:lraw has been announced:
public confidence will be
destroyed overnight and with it may vĨnish the inclination
to recept established authority.
6.
te have a responsibility to protect, and provide for
the departure of, all British subjects and Commonwealth
eitizens of non-Chinese race and for Gurkha troops and
their dayendants. The numbers involved are about
61,000, including British and Jurkha servicemen and
their families (about 30,000 at the present time,
/ although .**
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