TOP AUCET
be some financially expensive resettioment problems,
10.
There are about 35,000 Hong Kong Chinose in
this country i there could be considerable opposition
Taiwan would no doubt in these
Amerios and
to taking any more.
of romet-noes take quite a largo mmber.
South American
Csanda are countries with large Chinese communities that
night take significant mambors.
countries (e.g. Brazil) might offer special facilities.
11. But we cannot talk to any of these countries
(other, possibly, then Amarion, Canada and Austrlis)
in advanos chout this problem. The period of our
ithdrawal is likely to be measured in months and part
experlonge (sa evidenced by U.ll. efforts on behalf of
refugeon) has shown that mech longer than thin will
be necessary to negotiate permanent battlesant
opportunities. Tempor:
transit areas will be
necessary and we may find countries very reluctant to
ant me host to large numbers of Chinese who have no
guarantee of permanent residence alsovhore. Singapor
Taiwan, Hanils and our Pacifio dependencias may be
possibilities.
12. There are the Pritish assets. It would be foasible
in a planned and phaeod withdrawal to arrange the renova
or transfer of a considerable properties of snoveable
assete (including of course military and particularly
"sani tive” equipment and stores). There would remain
large investments in fixed assets (building and harvy
plant) for which nothing could be realised except by
agreement with the Chinese.
13. That the Chinese would stand by while we stripped
Hong Kong of much yeople and assets whone removal we
wishad to arrange is, with the precedent of Shanghai
before us, extremely unlikely. We can expect to be
restricted both as to the time allowed and in our
TOM JECHAN
/froedce
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