TOP SECRET
COLONIAL
OFFICE
ttack; it is part of the Maoist creed that "liberation" should be the result of local initiativo, springing from strong indigonous roots, and should not be imposed from outside. These inhibitions on a direct Chinoso military attack do not oxclude the possibility of thoir sonding in military forcos on the protoxt of rostoring ordor if the situation in Hong Kong got completely out of control. Assuming this does not occur, we consider the most likely Chinese policy over the next fow months will be to encourage the continuation of subversion within tho Colony and to try to improve and
consolidate local Communist organisations,
5. In order to avoid the possibility of prolonged disturbancos which would havo vory damaging offocts economically and might evontually make our position untenablo, would it bo possible to nogotiato a withdrawal with the Chinese? It is assumod that no negotiated withdrawal would bo possible if China had launched a military attack as nogotiations would require a pauso in the fighting which would only bo likely to occur in conditions of stalemate. Such conditions would be inconceivable in view of Chinese overwhelming local
three military superiority. Thoro aro te other types of situation in which negotiations for such a withdrawal might be contemplated.
These are:-
(a) a situation of stability or relative stability in both
Hong Kong and China during which the British Government might dooido to end the colonial status of Hong Kong; A situation in which Kwangling broke away from control by Peking; a situation of such Communist-inspired confusion in Hong Kong that it was no longer possible for a British administration
to remain there.
Ex [Taher in slip I shop ]
72) is highly unlikely in the near future. The Cultural Revolution showe
no signs of coming to an end and seems certain to continue for some months at the least. So long as it does the campaign against the Hong Kong Governmont will porsist and negotiations in an atmosphere of calm will bo out of the question. o consider below what right happon after tho Cultural Revolution. At present the only situation in which negotiations scon possible is (b).} This pro-supposes that the campaign against the Hong Kong Government continues and is increasingly successful. In euch circumstances, realistic nogotiations with the Chinose would be very difficult. Experience haa show that the Chinese are most poluetent ever angotiate about what they roard indisputably a Chinese territory, If they
to the ascendan't word winning their campaign in Hong Kong to such an extent that we were forced to start withdrawing, it is almost cortain that the Chinese would press their advantage to the maximum with the intention of achieving the createst possiblo viatory for themselves and humiliation for us. "Negotiations" would only start after the Chinese had taken over effective
TOP SECRET
/control
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.