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attack; it is part of the Maoist creed that "liberation" should be the result of local initiative, springing from strong indigenous roots, and should not be imposed from outside. These inhibitions on a direct Chinese
military attack do not exclude the possibility of their sonding in military forces on the pretext of restoring order if the situation in Hong Kong got completely out of control. Assuming this does not occur, we consider the most likely Chinese policy over the next few months will be to encourage the continuation of subversion within the Colony and to try to improve and
consolidate local Communist organisations.
5. In order to avoid the possibility of prolonged disturbances which would have very damaging effects economically and might eventually make our position untenable, would it be possible to negotiate a withdrawal with the Chinese? It is assumed that no negotiated withdrawal would be possible if China had launched a military attack as negotiations would require a pause in the fighting which would only be likely to occur in conditions of stalemate. Such conditions would be inconceivable in view of Chinese overwhelming local
military superiority. There are two other types of situations in which
L negotiations for such a withdrawal might be contemplated. These are:- (a) a situation of stability or relative stability in both
Hong Kong and China during which the British Government
might decide to end the colonial status of Hong Kong;
(2) a situation of such Communist-inspired confusion in Hong Kong
that it was no longer possible for a British administration
to remain there.
(a) is highly unlikely in the near future. The Cultural Revolution showS
no signs of coming to an end and seems certain to continue for some months
at the least. So long as it does the campaign against the Hong Kong Government will persist and negotiations in an atmosphere of calm will be
out of the question. We consider below what might happen after the
Cultural Revolution. At present the only situation in which negotiations
soon possible is (b).] This pre-supposes that the campaign against the
Hong Kong Government continues and is increasingly successful. In such
circumstances, realistic nogotiations with the Chinese would be very
difficult. Experience has shown that the Chinose are most reluctant ever to
nogotiate about what they regard indisputably as Chinose territory. If they
In the were winning their campaign in Hong Kong to such an extent that we were forced to start withdrawing, it is almost certain that the Chinese would press their advantage to the maximum with the intention of achieving the greatest possible viatory for themselves and humiliation for us. "Negotiations" would only start after the Chinese had taken over effective
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