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an orderly withdrawal, Of the total population of nearly four million, probably about a half are citizens of the U.K. and Colonies. The overwhelming majority of these would have to be left to their fate. Large numbers of them would no doubt accommodate themselves to the new regime. But many would suffer. Apart from the British forces and their families (numbering togethor some 30,000), we should presumably also have to try to ensure that of the non-Chinese residents (about 47,000, of whom some 31,000 originate from Commonwealth countries) those who wished to do so were able to leave the Colony when the British administration was withdrawn. Finally, the Governor's very rough estimate is that there are about 20,000 Chinese in Hong Kong for whom we should have to try to secure some other option than that of simply being abandoned to Communist China. These include about 5,000 (or one half) of the police, some 2,000 to 3,000 in the public service, and the rost would be professional or semi-professional people. By no moans all of them are people to whom Government has any obligation, other than to seek some kind of "safe conduct" guarantee to enable them to go where they wished and could get to under their own arrangonents: many, for instance, have contacts in Taiwan, the United States, Canada and this country, and would get out under their own arrangements provided they wore not provented from doing so. But there are undoubtedly some, especially in the police and Administration, to whom we are normally committed, and who would need help. Probably a good number of them would wish to go to Taiwan, if they could be helped to get there but would Poking over countenance our helping persons of Chinese descont to get to Taiwan? It might be necessary to contemplato bringing a fair number of hard core cases to the U.K., ponding decisions on thoir ro- settlemont.
11.
We asked the Governor and the C.B.F. whether there was any contingency planning that could usefully be undertaken at this stago. They were both categorical that this could not possibly be undertaken in Hong Kong, or oven in Singapore. Their reason is that for any such planning to bo at all meaningful a fairly wide circle of people in Hong Kong would necessarily have to be involved. This would, in their viow, entail an unacceptable risk of leakage; and they believe (wo felt rightly) that if public opinion in Hong Kong once suspected that there was contingency planning for a possible British withdrawal, that would load to a very serious collapse of public and police norale, with public opinion swinging right against us. This would croate a situation which the Communists would be quick to exploit, and would probably encourage them to try an all-out confrontation. We should then find ourselves quickly in dosperate straits,
12. To put it shortly, Sir David Trench and General Worsley believe that there is nothing we can do at present to organise a goneral withdrawal from Hong Kong, or to plan for that contingency. They statod more than once that they believe wo aro trappod in Hong Kong; and that our only possible stance for the tinc being is to do our level bost to stay thoro on our torms, frankly recognising that if we fail we are more likely to face capitulation than the possibility of an orderly withdrawal. They fool that wo have no option but to sweat it out on this basis, if we possibly can, until the post-Mao poriod, in the hope that wo might then get back to a less dangerous relationship with mainland China. Thoy both add the rider that if we do succood in riding out the present storm and can achieve once again the kind of relationship which Hong Kong had with China prior to the Cultural Revolution, we should then vory seriously look for a suitable opportunity of extricating ourselves from Hong Kong by a negotiated settlonont with Poking.
13. It soonod to us that tho appreciation and views of the Governor and the C.B.F. wore in the circumstancos realistic. It is a stark thought indood that, for the present at any rate, wo are trapped in Hong Kong,
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