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with very little chance of being able to negotiate an orderly with- drawal, and with all that this implies if the Communists should decide on all-out confrontation. But this does appear to us to be the situation with which we are faced.
14. But while fully accepting the view of Sir David Trench and Gonoral Worsley that contingency planning for a possiblo British withdrawal from Hong Kong, should circumstancos pormit, should not bo undertaken locally because of the grave dangers to which we should bo exposed if this should ever becomo known, wo felt that we ought to try to give some noro thought in London to tho problems we could expect to have to face. The docision takon by D.O.P.C. at thoir meeting on May 25th that officials should consider our policy in respect of Hong Kong affords the opportunity for conducting this study. But we shall have to be extremely careful to consult nobody in Hong Kong save the Governor and the C.B.F. personally.
15. Wo realise that a British decision to try to withdraw from Hong Kong would involve several important foreign and Commonwealth interests, Wo did not attempt to discuss those with the Governor and the C.B.F., sinco in our talks in Hong Kong wo were primarily concerned with the basic question whether we would be likely to be able to extricato ourselves in circumstances other than those of a capitulation, should wo docido to do so.
The committee of officials referred to in paragraph 14 of this minuto will obviously have to identify those foreign and Commonwealth interests.
16. and Mr. Cartor. If you agree, wo might circulate copies to the Official Committee, as at least a starting point for their examination of this complex of problons?
This minuto has boon drafted in consultation with Mr. Bolland
SD:
A.N. GALSWORTHY
31st May, 1967
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