TNAG-0041-FCO40-77-Future-Sovereignty-of-Hong-Kong-Defence-Review-Working-Party-1967 — Page 94

7.

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(iii) the certain collapse of public confidence and internal

security during a period of withdrawal making any general or even large-scale evacuation of non-Chinese impossible - since the military forces available in Hong Kong could not both maintain order and cover an

evacuation;

(iv)

an orderly withdrawal, taking some account of our obligations and interests, could not be accomplished without agreement and co-operation of China; (v) in these circumstances, the negotiating cards in our

hands would be reduced to the Hong Kong assets in the

United Kingdom;

(vi)

difficulties of the situation in the longer term as we progress towards the end of the lease of the

New Territories.

(c) Could the threat of economic sanctions or American

involvement strengthen our negotiating position?

Would

our allies in fact co-operate to secure our withdrawal from Hong Kong?

(a) Does this mean that China is in a position to dictate when

Or have we any

and how negotiated withdrawal takes place? cards that might persuade China to come to the negotiating table at a time of our choosing and when our position is

not desperate?

(e) Timing of negotiations in relation to the waning of business

confidence as 1997 approaches.

(f) Is there any prospect of our negotiating satisfactory

terms for staying in Hong Kong proper?

Recommendations and Conclusions

To be drafted later7

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