TNAG-0041-FCO40-77-Future-Sovereignty-of-Hong-Kong-Defence-Review-Working-Party-1967 — Page 93

6.

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(c) Possible Chinese tactics:

(i) to establish a Macau-type control over the Colony? (ii) by subversion to make our position untenable;

(iii) to take over by military force.

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(d) We could not accept (i) which would leave us with

responsibilities without the power to carry them out and

(ii) is likely to be the natural result of our failure to submit to (i). (iii) is unlikely. In order to avoid (ii)

could we get the Chinese to negotiate our withdrawal in

accordance with their declared policy?

(e) Long-term possibility of change in Chinese attitude after

departure of Mao Tse Tung.

5.

Are there any means of frustrating Chinese intentions? Office (a, b, d, e); Foreign Office (c)

(Commonwealth

(a) A separate existence for Hong Kong independent of Britain

(b)

or China, under some neutral United Nations status is

impracticable.

Could we exercise any pressure by threatening economic

sanctions, either on our own or in conjunction with our allies (e.g. Australian and Canadian wheat supplies)? (c) What are the prospects of American involvement? Could

American threats forestall Chinese action to obtain control

over or to recover the territory?

(a) Scope for building up security forces.

(e) Does this lead to conclusion that we can do no more than

postpone a Chinese takeover?

What are the prospects of a negotiated solution? Office, with other Departments)

(Commonwealth

(a) Modes of withdrawal: including (i) the prospects that an

improved political situation in China might later make possible and advantageous to us, a negotiated voluntary and ordered withdrawal, and (ii) the possibility that such a

withdrawal might be aided by an interim period of dual Anglo-Chinese control (resembling in some respects the Macau situation).

(b) Problems of withdrawal in each case:

(i) Our responsibilities - to British subjects,

(ii)

foreign nationals, British and foreign investment;

the great majority of British subjects of Chinese

race would have nowhere to go. The Chinese Government could frustrate (as they did in Shanghai)

the withdrawal of assets;

m5mm

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