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In further discussion of C 165/5(67) 1, the following additional
points were made
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(a) Consideration should be given at the appropriate time to approaching the United States authorities in respect of possible assistance from
United States naval vessels.
(b) If the course of Chinese Government action was effectively determined by the pace set by the local Chinese Communists in Hong Kong there would be advantage in the firmest possible measures being taken by the Hong Kong Government against the local Communists.
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It might be worth setting out in an appendix to the paper for Ministers the sort of conditions that would be imposed under a settlement similar to
that at Macao.
Summing up the discussion, THE CHAIRMAN said that a short paper for Ministers should now be prepared by representatives of the Commonwealth Office, Foreign Office and Cabinet Office, drawing on the material in C 165/5(67) 1 and the main points made in the present discussion, for consideration by the Working Party at a meeting on Thursday, 20th July prior to submission to Ministers on the 21st July for consideration by then at a meeting on Monday, 24th July. The paper, which should be directed to the short-term situation, night begin by referring to our lack of knowledge of the intentions of the Peking or provincial Chinese Governments and the relation between these Governments and the behaviour of the Chinese Communists in Hong Kong. It was clear however that while China gained materially in the short term from the continuance of Hong Kong as at present, it could not be regarded as certain that this would deter the Chinese Government from extreme measures. They had a very strong desire to humiliate us while at the same time seeking to continue to gain material advantage. We might be able to sustain the position in Hong Kong for a considerable period or might be ejected at comparatively short notice. paper night then go on to refer to the means of pressure available to the Chinese (propaganda, fomenting disturbances, industrial action, cutting off of supplies, trade enbargo, harassment and demonstrations on the frontier). At present by far the greater part of the Chinese population of Hong Kong was on the British side, the position of the police was good, and we still had reserves to draw on. The situation could be held unless the Peking Government or the local provincial authorities were determined to oust us, or the police became worn down. In that case we should be forced either to accept the situation of the Macao type, or to leave Hong Kong. Withdrawal could not be accomplished without heavy sacrifices and the
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