HONG KONG
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The Working Party considered a note by the Commonwealth Office (C 165/5(67) 1) to which was attached a draft interim report for Ministers on Hong Kong prepared by the Commonwealth Office, in consultation with the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence, as agreed at the meeting of the Working Party on 26th June (C 165/5(67) 1st Meeting, Conclusion (1)).
SIR ARTHUR GALSWORTHY said that the question whether any kind of planning for a withdrawal should be undertaken, and how, was fraught with difficulties. It had long been the view of the Hong Kong administration that planning for evacuation, because of the dangers of disclosure and the consequent effects on our position in Hong Kong, was a near impossibility. The position had now become even more difficult and dangerous because many Chinese in Hong Kong had now declared themselves openly on our side. If there were any disclosure that evacuation was being planned there would be an immediate swing in local Chinese opinion against us and this would make our position much more difficult. In discussions with the Governor and the General Officer Commanding in May, the former had stated his view that because of the danger of disclosure it would not be possible to undertake any planning in Hong Kong or even in Singapore. Nevertheless, it was necessary to attempt some sort of contingency planning against the worst eventuality despite the difficulty of obtaining the necessary information from the Hong Kong administration without the latter knowing the purpose for which it was required. His own guess was that the Chinese Government had no immediate intention of enforcing our withdrawal; economically, it would suit them very well if we remained in Hong Kong in a position of
subservience to their demands. But in any case there was no possibility
of our extricating ourselves in an orderly manner or with honour if the
Chinese Government decided to drive us out,
In discussion it was argued strongly that a situation of the type imposed by the Chinese Government on Macao would be totally unacceptable. We should lose effective control of the administration, including the
police, and should be giving hostages to the Chinese Government, while our naterial interests at the same time would suffer damage in that the
economy of Hong Kong would be directed to our detriment. On the other hand, the point was made that the conditions which it would be necessary to accept need not prove to be wholly similar to those imposed on Macao, and we should have sone cards in our hand, e.g. in respect of the sterling
Shanghai Bank.
Hong Kong
and
holdings of the Shanghai Hong Keng Bank.
On the basis that such a situa-
tion might be for a limited period only the relevant considerations should,
it was suggested, at least be examined.
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