TNAG-0034-FCO40-70-Relations-with-China-1968 — Page 27

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H.M. Chargé d'Affaires in Peking has watched the progress

of the covert probe with ch uneasy ey*. He has commented on

the fact that it is the contact rather than we ourselves who

has been playing the tune (Peking telegram No. 883). He has

pointed out that the passage of time makes the release of Hsuch

increasingly valueless as a concession and has recommended.

his immediate release (Peking telegram No. 891).

In a

further telegram (Peking telegram No. 906) he has reinforced

this proposal with the recommendation that we consider

releasing both Haush and Lo without prior undertakings.

makes it clear that he disagrees with the apparent immobilism

of the Governor on the following grounds:-

(a) humanitarian grounds;

(b)

soon as possible;

He

the need to get Hr. Grey out as

the difficulty of defending further delay in public and

ih Parliament;

(c) giving the Chinese time to release Mr. Grey has not

worked in the past;

(a)

while the Chinese have said they do not want negotiations

they have not said that they do not want the release of

Heuch or Lo. Negotiation may be the slippery path;

unilateral release is not (Peking telegrams Nos. 891 & 906).

Argument

9. I see much force in Mr. Cradock'a case.

Ideally there is

no doubt that the course most likely at the outset to lead to

the release of Mr. Grey was unilateral release in Hong Kong

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/ of both