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H.M. Chargé d'Affaires in Peking has watched the progress
of the covert probe with ch uneasy ey*. He has commented on
the fact that it is the contact rather than we ourselves who
has been playing the tune (Peking telegram No. 883). He has
pointed out that the passage of time makes the release of Hsuch
increasingly valueless as a concession and has recommended.
his immediate release (Peking telegram No. 891).
In a
further telegram (Peking telegram No. 906) he has reinforced
this proposal with the recommendation that we consider
releasing both Haush and Lo without prior undertakings.
makes it clear that he disagrees with the apparent immobilism
of the Governor on the following grounds:-
(a) humanitarian grounds;
(b)
soon as possible;
He
the need to get Hr. Grey out as
the difficulty of defending further delay in public and
ih Parliament;
(c) giving the Chinese time to release Mr. Grey has not
worked in the past;
(a)
while the Chinese have said they do not want negotiations
they have not said that they do not want the release of
Heuch or Lo. Negotiation may be the slippery path;
unilateral release is not (Peking telegrams Nos. 891 & 906).
Argument
9. I see much force in Mr. Cradock'a case.
Ideally there is
no doubt that the course most likely at the outset to lead to
the release of Mr. Grey was unilateral release in Hong Kong
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/ of both