TNAG-0033-FCO40-69-Relations-with-China-1968 — Page 185

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GEORET

5 -

Plag E

Mr. Grey and that we would inevitably have to involve ourselves

in dealings with them about the release of Lo. We would thus

have lost two months and also such bargaining advantage as we

now possess from being able to give the Chinese the satisfaction

of premature release of Haush. I in general agree with the

Governor that to make considerable concessione in the hope of a

response is the wrong way to buy settlements; and I see much

force in his arguments for standing firm until November.

But

in this particular instɑnce I think that, both on tactical

and humanitarian grounds, we should take action with the Chinese

now

11. If this is accepted, we are thus left with the courses

involving an immediate probe of Chinese intentions either

through secret channels in Hong Kong er formal channels in

Peking. My views on these are still as set out in my

submission of 8 Augusti

a)

If we make a formal approach it is unlikely that the

Chinese will give any firm guarantee about releasing

Mr. Grey. At the best they might use a form of words

which would indicate that they were prepared to consider

releasing him. At worst they might launch into a tirade

indicating that without some much more substantial mov●

on our part towards meeting their "demands" in respect of

all Communist prisoners, there was no point in our raising

the question of Mr. Grey. But in either case we should

have a firmer basis for judgement on the prospects that

an act of clemency for Hsueh and Lo would secure the

release of Kr. Grey.

/ d) The covert

OLCRET