ን
GEORET
5 -
Plag E
Mr. Grey and that we would inevitably have to involve ourselves
in dealings with them about the release of Lo. We would thus
have lost two months and also such bargaining advantage as we
now possess from being able to give the Chinese the satisfaction
of premature release of Haush. I in general agree with the
Governor that to make considerable concessione in the hope of a
response is the wrong way to buy settlements; and I see much
force in his arguments for standing firm until November.
But
in this particular instɑnce I think that, both on tactical
and humanitarian grounds, we should take action with the Chinese
now
11. If this is accepted, we are thus left with the courses
involving an immediate probe of Chinese intentions either
through secret channels in Hong Kong er formal channels in
Peking. My views on these are still as set out in my
submission of 8 Augusti
a)
If we make a formal approach it is unlikely that the
Chinese will give any firm guarantee about releasing
Mr. Grey. At the best they might use a form of words
which would indicate that they were prepared to consider
releasing him. At worst they might launch into a tirade
indicating that without some much more substantial mov●
on our part towards meeting their "demands" in respect of
all Communist prisoners, there was no point in our raising
the question of Mr. Grey. But in either case we should
have a firmer basis for judgement on the prospects that
an act of clemency for Hsueh and Lo would secure the
release of Kr. Grey.
/ d) The covert
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