TNAG-0032-FCO40-68-Relations-with-China-1968 — Page 37

CONFIDENTIAL

Because Then toelici Jailed?

Chinese Attitude and Objectives.

Are the

7. At this juncture in the argument it would be useful to make

some estimate of Chinese attitudes and objectives.

Chinese authorities interested in co-existence, or the end of

confrontation on terms we might consider tolerable?

What

would they expect to get out of it? It would be a mistake to

dismiss China in its present state as a kind of mad giant, to

conclude from the turmoil in Centon and the corpses floating

down the Pearl River that any reasonable converse is impossible,

that all we can do is, therefore, to strengthen our defences,

political and military, in Hong Kong, and add a prayer for the

British subjects in China. In fact a striking feature about

the trouble even last year is that much more could have been done

by Foking to make our position difficult or impossible in Hong

Kong, c.g. no arms were sent in and the bomb campaign was

obviously disapproved of. Since then the wish of the Chinese

Government to get back to some sort of co-existence has been

evident from c.g. the calling off of violence, the reduction and

threatened withdrawal of financial support for Hong Kong

communists on strike, the maintenance of order on the frontier,

the control shown recently over reinstatement delegations

when they threatened to become disorderly. All this proves

a positive wish to keep the tension down and live and let live.

It is all donc quite naturally from selfish motives. China's

large foreign exchange carnings in Hong Kong are a vitally

important factor in her foreign trade plan

particularly /important

CONFIDENTIAL