TNAG-0032-FCO40-68-Relations-with-China-1968 — Page 36

CONFIDENTIAL

6.

Furthermore, we have had it officially and explicitly

from the Chinese, at many interviews during the past months,

that there can be no "normalisation" of Sino-British relations

so long as the question of Hong Kong is left on one side.

While careful not to dissent from the aim of improving

relations between Britain and China, they have repeatedly

said that they are waiting for concrete actions from us in

Hong Kong as an earnest of our good intentions. Nor must

we overlook the fact that the Chinese Government have taken

up a public stand on confrontation which they can hardly

abandon without great loss of face both at home and abroad.

They are smarting from the defeat they sustained after the failure of the communist campaign of violence in 1967. Morc-

over they may well still have some difficulty controlling their

Hong Kong supporters. In present circumstances, therefore,

unless they are provided with some device that will allow them

to claim, however implausibly, that their demands in Hong

Kong have been satisfied, the Chinese cannot be expected

to drop their confrontation policy. We must also remember

that while this situation persists there is continuing danger that some incident, whether fortuitous or deliberately provoked, may lead to a renewal of violence in Hong Kong, which would not only prevent an improvement in Sino-British

relations but would lead to a further deterioration.

Chinese

CONFIDENTIAL