CONFIDENTTAT,
any but their own standpoint.
They constantly attack ard attempt to
undermine the position of the other side and ere rarely caught on the
defensive.
(b) The Chinese are propared to use abuse, cajolery ard endless
repetition of their views as a means of wearing down the other side.
After achieving a success they terd to become more genial and offer
the propsect of a continuation of this relaxed atmosphere if the other
side "co-operate".
(c) The Chinese are hard bargainers and expect others to be the same.
If concessions are mande too casily or too soon they are likely to
increase their demaris.
(d) The Chinese are rarely in a hurry and exploit the desire of the
other side to end a negotiation quickly.
(e) The Chinese do, however, have a realisation of the facts of a
problem and the strengths and weaknessca of their position and that of
the other side. If they wish to ses a problem settled they are
prepared to compromise within limits, preferably if the compromise can
be presented in such a way as not to cause them to lose face. If they
give a specific undertaking e.g. to grant access to Mr. Grey in
exchange for additional visits to journalists in prison in Hong Kong,
they are likely to honour it.
(F) All Chinese negotiators need to be cautious in order to preserve
their own positions and are unlikely (except at the very top level,
e.g. Chon Er-lai at Geneva) to take any initiatives not sunctioned by
their superiors.
4. The following are some of the guide lines in the light of the
above:-
COMF IDSNTIAL
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